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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The following parties or attorneys are now or have 
been interested in this litigation or any related proceedings. 
1. First Security Mortgage Company was the named 
defendant when this litigation commenced. On June 3, 1988, 
Judge Pat B. Brian entered an Order whereby Leucadia Financial 
Corporation was substituted for First Security Mortgage Company 
for all purposes. (R.844-46) Leucadia Financial Corporation 
is asserting the rights of First Security Mortgage Company in 
this appeal. 
2. Craig L. Taylor, Esq., previously appeared as 
counsel for First Security Mortgage Company prior to the 
above-mentioned substitution of parties. 
3. All other parties are reflected in the caption, 
and all other counsel have entered their appearance. 
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the Order of Partial Summary 
Judgment signed by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on 
February 1, 1988, the Final Judgment and Decree of Specific 
Performance, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on May 6, 
1988 and the Order, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on 
May 6, 1988. All of these orders and judgments were entered in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, Utah. 
This appeal was filed on June 3, 1988 with the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated 
(1988). On August 22, 1988, the Supreme Court notified the 
parties that the case was poured-over to the Court of Appeals 
for disposition. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ordering specific 
performance where plaintiff Kelleyfs tender of performance was 
defective because conditional and therefore insufficient to 
enable Kelley to bring this action? 
2. Did the trial court err in ordering specific 
performance where an unconditional tender of performance was 
not made by the closing date? 
- i -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent William R. Kelley, Jr. ("Kelley") 
commenced this action in the Third Judicial District Court on 
September 22, 1987, against Defendant-Appellant First Security 
Mortgage Company ("First Security"). In this action, Kelley 
requested a declaratory judgment for the interpretation of 
rights, status and legal relationship under an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement ("Agreement"), sought a decree of specific 
performance requiring First Security to convey certain property 
as contracted in the Agreement, and prayed for damages for 
breach of the Agreement. (R.l-11) 
Thereafter, on November 10, 1987, First Security filed 
a Motion to Dismiss and for Attorneys1 Fees. (R.72-73) In 
response, Kelley filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
November 27, 1987. (R.137-39) The Court entered its Order 
granting Kelley Partial Summary Judgment on February 3, 1988. 
(R.562-64) This Order granted KelleyTs request for a decree of 
specific performance and retained jurisdiction over the matter 
to determine whether Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the 
purchase price and damages. (R.562-64) First Security filed a 
1. First Security was the named defendant when this litigation 
commenced. By order of the Court, Leucadia Financial 
Corporation was substituted for First Security and is asserting 
the rights of First Security in this appeal. (R.844-46) 
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Motion to Amend Judgment (R.343-344), an Objection to Proposed 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R.345-46), and a 
Motion for Reconsideration (R.907), all of which were denied by 
the Court. 
First Security filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
relating to Kelley?s claims for punitive damages and on May 6, 
1988, the Court entered its Order which, among other things, 
granted summary judgment in favor of First Security. 
(R.812-14) On the same day, the Court found the parties had 
otherwise settled all claims relating to the amount of damages 
to be awarded Kelley and entered its Final Judgment and Decree 
of Specific Performance. (R.815-18) Leucadia Financial 
Corporation ("Leucadia") was substituted for First Security on 
June 3, 1988 for purposes of appeal concerning the decree of 
specific performance and all orders or judgments. (R.844-46) 
In that capacity, Leucadia filed its notice of appeal on 
June 3, 1988. (R.847-49) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts before the District Court were not 
disputed. They are as follows: 
1. The Agreement Between The Parties. 
On or about February 20, 1987, First Security Mortgage 
Company, as seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer, 
executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase of 
real property, a copy of which is Appendix 1 to this brief. 
(R.14-22) Pursuant to this Agreement, Kelley agreed to 
purchase and First Security agreed to convey title to certain 
property situated at 320 West Snows Lane, Park City, Utah 
("Subject Property"). (R.14) 
There were several addenda to the Agreement which 
altered the Agreement only by extending the time for closing. 
In the first addendum to the Agreement, the parties agreed to 
extend the closing to April 20, 1987. (R.18) Thereafter, the 
parties extended the closing date to on or before June 1, 1987 
(R.19); on or before July 1, 1987 (R.20); on or before 
August 31, 1987 (R.21). By letter dated September 4, 1987, 
the closing date was extended to September 15, 1987 (R.114); 
by letter dated September 14, 1987, the time for closing was 
extended until September 22, 1987 (R.116). 
2. The Terms Of The Agreement. 
The parties bargained for the following terms in their 
Agreement: 
a) The property is sold "as is" without warranty 
with title to be conveyed by special warranty deed. (R.16) 
b) Agreement is conditioned on seller furnishing 
good and marketable title to the property as evidenced by a 
current policy of title insurance. (R.16 1T3) 
c) Seller to provide a current certified survey 
of the property. (R.18) 
d) In the event of a title problem, Buyer is to 
give Seller written notice of his objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller is required to cure the defects to which 
Buyer has objected, if such can be done through escrow at 
closing. If the defects are not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, the Buyer has the option of waiving the 
defects and proceeding with the closing or he may require the 
Seller to return the earnest money deposit and the Agreement 
will be null and void. (R.15 UG) 
e) In the event there is loss or damage to the 
property between the date of the Agreement and the date of 
closing by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or 
acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage exceeds ten 
percent of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may either 
proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to 
repair or replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare 
this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less 
than ten percent of the purchase price and Seller agrees in 
writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and 
replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction 
shall proceed as agreed. (R.17 TIP) 
f) With regard to the extension of closing 
dates, time is of the essence of this Agreement. (R.17 1TQ) 
g) This instrument constitutes the entire 
Agreement of the parties. (R.17 UL) 
3. The Dispute. 
At the time this Agreement was executed, both Kelley 
and First Security understood the Subject Property to include 
land which was enclosed by fences, a stream, a spring and a 
pond. (R.276) Shortly after the Agreement was executed, First 
Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had a survey 
conducted of the Subject Property. Through this survey, First 
Security discovered that the Quit-Claim Deed by which it 
claimed its interest in the property contained an erroneous 
property description which did not coincide with the natural 
boundaries of the property. (R.143) This faulty property 
description was a result of a prior erroneous survey and 
previous conveyances of the property incorporating the 
description from the erroneous survey. (R.81, 150) The result 
of this erroneous description was that the boundary shifted 
approximately 15.22 feet to the south such that neither the 
spring, the stream nor the pond would be included in the 
conveyance contemplated by the Agreement. (R.143) 
_ £ _ 
In addition, First Security believes that one or more 
of the adjacent landowners came on the property and sawed off a 
pipe supplying water to the pond located on the property and 
removed fish from the pond. (R.82) Consequently, the pond 
virtually dried up and the water feeding the pond from the pipe 
has been diverted from the property, (R.82) 
First Security attempted to resolve these problems 
with the landowners of the adjacent property, but was unable to 
do so through negotiation. (R.357) Accordingly, First 
Security commenced a lawsuit against the landowners to recover 
for damages to the property, to compel the determination of any 
claims adverse to First Security's title, to establish correct 
boundaries, to quiet title to, and to obtain a declaration of 
First Security's rights with respect to the property. 
(R.23-59) It became clear, however, that the adjacent 
landowners would not resolve the dispute without substantial 
litigation which First Security was unwilling to undertake 
without reimbursement from Kelley. (R.114-15) 
4. The Termination Of The Agreement. 
By August 31, 1987, the last closing date mutually 
agreed to by the parties, neither party had performed nor 
tendered performance under the Agreement. (R.35 9) On 
September 4, 1987, First Security sent Kelley a letter 
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indicating that resolution of the boundary dispute and property 
damage could not be done through negotiation but, rather, would 
require substantial litigation. (R.114-15) Accordingly, First 
Security offered Kelley the options bargained for in the 
Agreement in the event of a dispute rendering title to the 
property unmarketable or in the case of damage to property 
prior to closing. Namely, Kelley could either waive the 
defects and proceed to closing or First Security would return 
the earnest money deposit. (R. 114-15; R.15 HG; R.17 HP) Under 
these terms, the closing was scheduled for September 15, 1987, 
and, at KelleyTs request, later extended until September 22, 
1987. (R.114-15, 116) 
On September 22, 1987, however, Kelley declined to 
close under either of the options provided in the letter as 
required by the Agreement. (R.119-21) Instead, Kelley 
tendered the down payment in escrow, and stated that such 
tender was conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary 
dispute, rectifying the property damage, and clearing title 
prior to closing. (R.120) A copy of Kelleyfs tender is 
Appendix 2 to this brief. Thereafter, First Security orally 
offered to extend the closing deadline to October 8, 1987, if, 
in accordance with the Agreement, Kelley desired to purchase 
the property "as is." (R.296) Kelley refused this offer, 
however, stating that First Security was obligated to resolve 
the disputes and then convey the property to Kelley. (R.297) 
Inasmuch as First Security was unable to repair or replace the 
damaged property, and because Kelley did not waive the defects 
in the title and close the sale on or before September 22, 
1987, but rather, made his tender of down payment conditional, 
First Security executed a release of Kelleyfs earnest money 
deposit on September 24, 1987. (R.122-25) 
Kelley filed this action on September 22, 1987, 
requesting an order of the Court that First Security was 
obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, repair or replace 
the property, and then convey the property to Kelley. (R.7) 
5. The Sale Of The Subject Property To Leucadia. 
On September 25, 1987, First Security received an 
earnest money offer to purchase the Subject Property from 
Leucadia, and began negotiating a purchase and sale agreement 
with Leucadia. (R.362) On November 2, 1987, First Security and 
Leucadia entered into a binding Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
for the sale of the Subject Property. (R.362) On November 25, 
1987, the Subject Property was sold to Leucadia. (R.362) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an unconditional 
tender of performance is a prerequisite to an action for 
specific performance. In this action, First Security argues 
that the lower court erred in ordering specific performance of 
the Agreement because Kelley's tender of performance was 
conditional on First Security providing a remedy not required 
by the Agreement. Moreover, Kelley failed to make an adequate 
tender prior to the expiration of the Agreement on its own 
terms. Accordingly, the lower court's order of specific 
performance of the Agreement is erroneous, as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
In reviewing a case disposed of in the District Court 
by summary judgment, the reviewing court must consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirm the decision only where it appears there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Themy v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). In 
this action, the facts are undisputed. Appellant's contention 
is that the District Court erred as a matter of law in ordering 
specific performance of the Agreement. 
I. AN UNCONDITIONAL TENDER OF PERFORMANCE IS A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO A DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
On several occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has 
considered under what circumstances a tender of performance is 
sufficient for purposes of ordering specific performance of a 
contract. In response to this query, the Utah Supreme Court 
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has repeatedly and consistently held that a complete and 
unconditional tender is a prerequisite to an action for 
specific performance. 
In Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Inc., 622 P.2d 808 
(Utah 1981), for example, a purchaser brought an action for 
specific performance of a purchase agreement involving two 
condominium units entered into between the parties in May, 
1977. The terms of the initial purchase agreement were that 
the buyer was to make a cash down payment of 10% and to obtain 
a mortgage loan for the remaining 90%. 622 P.2d 809. The date 
of the closing was left open. In October, 1978, the seller 
requested that the purchaser complete the purchase within the 
next ten days by depositing the 10% down payment and making 
application for the 90% loan. Plaintiff did not comply with 
this letter, but proposed several alternative offers, none of 
which was accepted by the defendant. Id. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff made two "tenders of 
performance." In January, 1979, the plaintiff tendered the 10% 
down payment but did not state whether she had made application 
for the loan for the additional 90%; defendant did not respond 
to this tender. !Ed. In February, 1979, plaintiff tendered 
more money for the two units and required seller to carry a 
contract for 90% of the sales price; defendant did not respond 
to this tender. 622 P.2d 810. Thereafter, plaintiff brought 
an action for specific performance of the original agreement. 
The Court held that the plaintiff did not tender the 
performance required by the terms of the agreement and, 
accordingly, specific performance was denied. 622 P.2d at 811. 
The following year, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
why a conditional tender, that is one not in conformance with 
the terms of the agreement, is inadequate as a matter of law 
for purposes of bringing an action to compel performance: 
[With respect to] a contract . . . which 
contemplates simultaneous performance by both 
parties, such as the Earnest Money agreement 
involved in this case, neither party can be said 
to be in default (and thus susceptible to a 
judgment for damages or a decree for specific 
performance) until the other party has tendered 
his own performance. . . . In other words, the 
party who desires to use legal process to 
exercise his legal remedies under such a contract 
must make a tender of his own agreed performance 
in order to put the other party in 
default. . . . To qualify under this rule, a 
tender, such as an offer to pay money, must be 
complete and unconditional. 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. Webb, 645 
P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
See also Zionfs Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 
1975) (a tender requires that there be a bona fide, 
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of money due, 
coupled with an actual production of the money or its 
equivalent); Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) (to 
claim specific performance, a party must either perform or 
tender performance in accordance with the covenants in the 
contract. ) 
In this case, Kelleyfs "tender" was not in accordance 
with the terms of the Agreement between the parties. The 
Agreement clearly provided the options open to the purchaser in 
the event the title to the property was unmarketable: Where 
the defects in title were not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing (e.g., paying money to release liens or 
other encumbrances), the purchaser could either waive the 
defects and close the sale, or his earnest money deposit would 
be returned and the Agreement declared null and void. (R.15 
1FG) Similarly, the options available to the purchaser in the 
event of property damage caused by vandalism were provided by 
the Agreement: If the seller agrees to repair or replace the 
damaged property the buyer may, at his option, either proceed 
to closing or declare the Agreement null and void. (R.17 HP) 
Yet in this case, Kelleyfs tender was expressly 
conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary dispute, 
clearing title, and repairing or replacing the damaged property 
prior to closing, even though Kelley had knowledge that 
substantial litigation was required to do so. (R.120) 
Clearly, such a tender was not made in accordance with the 
provisions in the Agreement; rather, it was conditioned on 
First Security undertaking obligations not provided for in the 
Agreement and over which First Security had no control. 
By this Agreement, the parties stipulated to what the 
remedy would be in case of the failure or inability of First 
Security to provide merchantable title. Such a stipulation is 
binding, at least in the absence of bad faith. E.g., Lanna 
v. Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A.2d 837, 842 (1978); Scerbo v. 
Robinson, 63 App.Div.2d 1096, 406 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1978); 
Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615, 549 P.2d 274, 276 (1976). 
First Security never contemplated assuming the obligation to 
cure defects to title that could not be cured through escrow --
either before closing, as demonstrated by paragraph G of the 
Agreement, or after closing, as demonstrated by its inserting 
the "as is" and "without warranty" and "title conveyed by 
special warranty deed" language. By annexing an unwarranted 
condition to his tender of performance, Kelley in effect 
refused to perform. See Gerritsen v. Draney, 351 P.2d 667, 
673 (Wyo. 1960) (a tender made not in conformity with the 
contract is the same as if no tender is made at all); Johnson 
v. Goldberg, 130 Cal.App.2d 571, 279 P.2d 131 (1955) 
(conditional tender of performance is a refusal to perform). 
The parties also, by this Agreement, stipulated to 
what the remedy would be in the event of property damage caused 
by vandalism. First Security had no obligation to repair or 
replace the damaged property. Rather, the Agreement provided 
that if First Security had the ability to repair the damage and 
in fact did repair the damage, then Kelley could proceed with 
the Agreement. However where, as in this case, the correction 
of the damaged property was out of First Security's hands, the 
only obligation First Security had was to allow for the 
termination of the Agreement by its terms. Again, Kelleyfs 
tender of performance was not in conformance with the Agreement 
and, therefore, in effect was a refusal to perform. 
Gerritsen, 351 P.2d at 673; Johnson, 279 P.2d at 131. 
First Security, as a matter of law, was not obligated 
to accept Kelleyfs tender of performance requiring First 
Security to provide a remedy and undertake obligations not 
required by the Agreement. In turn, Kelleyfs conditional 
tender, as a matter of law, was deficient and therefore an 
insufficient basis to enable Kelley to bring an action in 
specific performance. The District Court's order of specific 
performance should be reversed. 
II. WHERE TIME IS THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT FAILURE TO 
TENDER BY THE CLOSING DATE DESTROYS RIGHT TO SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
The second question presented by this appeal, whether 
specific performance is appropriate where the Agreement 
terminated because the transaction was not closed nor adequate 
tender made by the agreed upon date, has also been expressly 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court. To this question, the 
Court has stated that where time is made the essence of the 
agreement, the parties must make tender by the stated closing 
date or both parties will be discharged from their obligations. 
In Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. 
Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982), as in this case, the purchasers 
brought an action against the seller of real property seeking 
specific performance of the sale of the seller's home pursuant 
to an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase agreement 
signed by the parties. 645 P.2d at 54. After the contract was 
signed but prior to closing, the buyers learned of an 
encumbrance on the property. The buyers insisted that the 
encumbrance be satisfied prior to closing, although under the 
terms of their contract, such a demand was not the buyer's 
right. 645 P.2d at 55. The parties had agreed upon a closing 
date of December 22; neither party made a tender of performance 
on or before that date. 645 P.2d at 54. However, on January 
9, 1979, the buyer advised the seller they were "ready and 
willing to close on this transaction" provided the seller 
cleared the encumbrance. 645 P.2d at 54-55. 
The court noted that the tender was, in that 
situation, made within the contract period; the court reasoned 
that in cases where the executory contract contains no 
declaration that time is of the essence, the contract 
obligations can continue for some time beyond the stated 
closing date. However, the court made clear this holding was 
limited to situations in which there is no time of essence 
agreement between the parties: 
Where the contract states that time is of the 
essence, cases hold that both parties are 
discharged from their contract obligations if 
neither makes tender by the agreed closing date. 
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 55 n.l (citations omitted). 
Significantly, the court found that even though made while the 
contract was still in effect (due to the lack of a time of 
essence clause), the tender was insufficient as a matter of law 
because it was conditional on a term not found in the agreement 
and declined to order specific performance. 645 P.2d at 56. 
The Court's notation that time of essence clauses are 
to be strictly enforced is in accord with holdings of other 
courts. Ejg., Nix v. Clary, 640 P.2d 246 (Colo. App. 1981) 
(purchasers were not entitled to specific performance as they 
failed to tender payment as required by the contract which 
provided that time was of the essence and give notice of their 
unconditional commitment to be bound by the contract); In re 
Gauthier, 493 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1972) (not selected for 
official publication) (where time is of essence of a contract, 
failure to tender payment when due destroyed right to specific 
performance of contract). 
In this action, the Agreement provides that "time is 
of the essence." (R.117 HQ) Significantly, this provision 
goes on to state: "This provision relates only to the 
extension of closing date." (R.117 UQ) The last extension of 
the closing date in this case provided that the closing was to 
occur on or before September 22, 1987. (R.116) On 
September 22, 1987, however, the performance Kelley tendered 
was insufficient as a matter of law because Kelleyfs tender was 
conditional on a term not found in the Agreement. See 
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56; see Point I supra. Because 
Kelley did not tender unconditional performance of the 
Agreement on or before September 22, 1987, the time of essence 
clause of the Agreement caused the Agreement to lapse. On that 
date, both parties were discharged from their obligations and 
thus neither party could be said to be in default and 
susceptible to judgment for damages or a decree for specific 
performance. See Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56 and at 55 n.l. 
Even assuming that despite the time of essence clause, 
the Agreement remained open, Kelley never attempted to tender 
unconditional performance of the Agreement after the last 
extension had expired. Indeed, First Security offered to allow 
closing on October 8, 1987, if Kelley would make an 
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unconditional tender of performance. (R.296) Again, however, 
Kelley refused, stating that First Security was obligated to 
provide a remedy to the title and property damage disputes not 
provided for in the Agreement. (R.297) 
In fact, when Kelley filed this action on September 22, 
1987, he requested an order of the Court that First Security 
was obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, rectify the 
property damage and then convey the property to Kelley -- which 
prayer is consistent with the position Kelley had assumed in 
refusing to go forward with the closing. (R.7) At some point, 
first reflected in the pleadings on November 25, 1987, Kelleyfs 
position changed. In the memorandum in support of KelleyTs 
motion for summary judgment (R.140-274), Kelley requests the 
court to order First Security to convey "whatever title it has" 
to the Subject Property. (R.181) Even then, Kelley sought 
damages in the form of abatement of the purchase price -- a 
remedy not bargained for in the Agreement. 
Moreover, by the time Kelley changed his position to 
seek conveyance of "whatever title [First Security] has," the 
time of essence clause of the Agreement had rendered the 
Agreement void. Indeed, by this time, First Security had 
pursued other options in reliance on Kelleyfs failure to tender 
appropriate performance on the date set for closing and, in 
i a 
fact, had entered into an agreement for the sale of the Subject 
Property to Leucadia. (R.362) 
The Agreement between First Security and Kelley 
provides that with respect to closing dates, time is of the 
essence. As a matter of law, this Agreement expired because 
Kelley did not make an unconditional tender of performance by 
the last agreed upon closing date, September 22, 1987. Even if 
the Agreement remained open despite the time of essence clause, 
Kelley never made an unconditional tender, despite First 
Security's willingness to close the deal according to the terms 
of the Agreement. As a matter of law, the Agreement expired by 
the failure of Kelley to proffer an unconditional tender. As 
such, the Agreement is incapable of being specifically enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering 
specific performance of the Agreement for several reasons. 
First, Kelley's tender of performance was deficient in that it 
required First Security to provide a remedy not required by the 
Agreement. Such a conditional tender is deficient as a matter 
of law and is therefore an insufficient basis to enable Kelley 
to bring an action in specific performance. Second, the 
agreement between First Security and Kelley provides that with 
respect to closing dates, time is of the essence. As a matter 
of law, this Agreement expired because Kelley did not make an 
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unconditional tender of performance by the closing date on 
September 22, 1987. As such, the Agreement is incapable of 
being specifically enforced. The District Court's order of 
specific performance should be reversed. 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
<>^Attorneyszfor Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellant to be 
hand delivered, this 23rd day of November, 1988, to the 
following: 
David R. Olsen 
Charles P. Sampson 
Claudia F. Berry 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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EARNED MONEY SALES AGRF' /1ENT APPENDIX 1 
Legend Yes (X) N< ^ * ^xtr-s^ soor/cg <+/<+$ 
This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire doci 
REALTOR" TS2y~Z^ l5~~ " ^ '£ 
B 
' ^ ^ ^ 3 r z k £ ^<i 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if present'y attached to the property plumbing. 
heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater built-in appliances light fixtures and bulbs bathroom fixtures curtains and draperies 
and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings installed television antenna wall-to-wall carpets water softener automatic garage door 
opener and trans mi tter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs 
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own examination and judgment and not by 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition size location present value future value income 
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is ' condition subject to Seller s wayanties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer d.esires 
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer* 
C SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property »"H«ch 
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations against the property including taxes assessments mortgages liens or other encumbrances 
o* any nature shall be brought current on or before closing and (c) the plumbing heating air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system and appliances 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing 
D CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers knowledge, provided an adequate supply of 
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is to the best of Seller s knowledge m good working order and 
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
v F ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement but not lest than three (3) days prior to closing 
Seller shall provide to Buyer wntten verification as to whether or not any notes mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts ags nst the property require the 
consent of the holder of such mstrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and 'or declare the entire balance due in the 
event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale then withm three (3) days after notrce of 
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving wntten notice 
to Seller or Seller's agent In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
for said "Due on Sale * clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
/ . TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (1 5) days after Seller s acceptance of this Aoreement but not less than three (31 days prior to closing Buyer 
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion or a preliminary title report on the subject property 
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller 
or Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter. Seller shall be required through escrow at closing, to cure the 
defect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing this Agreement shall be null and void at the option 
of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties 
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form AlTA 
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than 
those provided for in said standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through 
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer and this Agreement 
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
I EXISTING TENANT LEASES. • If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) days 
after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
the property Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent withm three (3) workmo days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to such 
leases If objection is not remedied within the stated time this Agreement shall be null and void 
OOlS 
J CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor 
new leases entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
L*gend ; . Yes(X) No<0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE 
The undersigned Buyer. /g/^z, Mr/L^ry 
as EARNEST MONEY the amount of 
in the form of Jfc*'•+-*-*>*> - r - f (L 
hereby deposits with Brokerage 
£ &r£yt*>*tSJj0<nitIltitt^ 
Z l _ Dollars (« / 4 2 f ^ ^ T 
>vhich shall be 7-
Brokerage Phone Number 
Received by 
deposaed in accordance with applicable State Law 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY isoiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated z\$£& (r^C**/ 
in the City of T~y County of . ^c;s>r*"'7~ Utah 
subject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or rights of way government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer 
in accordance with Section G Said property is more particularly described as _ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
£$3 UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot D Vacant Acreage D Other 
jBj IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commercial ^Residential D Condo • Other _ 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title AJ*/~ ^€^<'^^jfy 
(b) Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale st/&^*s£L 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
<_29 public sewer ^ _ connected 
j ^ s e p t i c tank ^"{connected 
& other sanitary system. 
{Jfcpublic water ^connected 
flpnvate water ^[connected 
jw jwe l l )^connected Oother 
68irrigation water 'secondary system 
<s of shares Company 
_3 TV antenna D master antenna D prewired 
^ n a t u r a l gas ^connected 
^electricity ^connected 
^ ingress & egress by private easement 
£J) dedicated road D paved 
<5>curb and gutter 
4& other rights . 
prior to closing, £1 shall not be furnished (d) Survey. A certified survey ^(shall be furnished at the expense of J? ^ AJL $L Z> 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase price for the property t< 
Dollars (5 
c
—«<^ —T-_r r£z.<£^+*~&C*-j>&r7V-u* 
&>ej<=>oo *&• which shall be paid as follows 
• * * -
which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at __________ % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include D principal Q interest D taxes D insurance Qcondo fees. Dother 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include Dprincipal Ointerest, Dtaxes Omsurance. Qcondo fees. Oother ____ 
representing balance, if any including proceeds from a new . . loan to be paid as follows 
"^ *$*•/& 0G0 s</<y>t/~ £g'/Ztss"J>/fJ2*-£ / ^ a^stsiTf^j£^/&<is&/? <<& £>sfy {y^Losrs^c. 
TOTAL f*Wu,Acr DR.rc g*Y£J£ /+*& 7*E &*' .£00000 PURCHASE PRICE SV-. 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and 'or procure same andjp 
offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and /or financing Buyer agrees to make application within . 
days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed % 
nd t^is 
If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing wi th in; 
at the option of the Buyer or Sellep'upon written notice or elle> o 
pK/4 
days after Se'ler s acceptance of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidable 
Seller agrees to pay $ f * /1L towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs including but not limitea to loan discount points 
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the oroaerty Section F shall apply 
Date 2- " ^» ' ; 7 Buyer's Initials ( U - ^ T t Page two of a four page form Seller* s Initials ( y{ ^ T Date &rfaV( 
» inni estate .-touudu imnsiH' O< bell»?r s owner«*t'»p mii^esi sr*an o** ma.n«* a«* set toun ••» seuion o - ••• n^it- ... n, . . .v. ^ K > U <I».W .».«.*». IOW.C IM.C ^ w.c 
property syb/ect to encumbrances and exceptio >ted Herein evidenced by J<^a current policy of titlt ira^~e in the amount of purchase p r i c e ^ a n abstract 
)f title brought current wtth an attorney s opinio. ee f DnH) 
* 4 , INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing 
3uyer'shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer O h a s ^ h a s not reviewed any condo-
nimom CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement 
5 V E S T I N G OF TITLE. Title shall vest m Buyer as follows v ^ ^ P / X l f t . T T " J> S DAy* /*&&&. r& £j-*SS<+'&^ 
6 SELLER WARRANTIES . In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following 
7 SPECIAL C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T I N G E N C I E S . This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and /or contingencies which must 
ae satisfied prior to closing SLS^f^s 
*sV$~ 
8 C L O S I N G OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before — " i n •—at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, subject to Section Q Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
with this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R. shall be made as of J^date of possession 0s^iate of ciosmg£?other 
9 P O S S E S S I O N . Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on _ unless extended by written agreement of parties 
10 GENERAL P R O V I S I O N S . Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
Agreement by reference 
11 A G R E E M E N T T O PURCHASE A N D T I M E L I M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller 
shall have .unt i l . to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the 
EAF / - - - - • - • - . " - s - ~ > ^ TT-V7 * R ( ^ y M O y f y ^ > f e , Buyer JZ^H^/' / Y / / , ^ _ ^ _ _ _ i l U ) ) X7 
ignaturtroT B<Jy* fV -^^ ~ \J ^ hY-*^v^ y^ ' Date Signature of I S a t u i w O T t K f e l ' w ( y [ / N ^ ^ - ' ^ ^ O *  Buyer Date 
CHECK ONE 
DACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
D REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
IfeCCOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in theattached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until *'C' ** (A M.t+ IvT) J}~cH . 19 & L 2 L to accept the terms 
specified below
 % j f ^ scitiea oeto jg
 0 * / / / • s) / / / / 
Time ZJJL c^AM^M) < ,> ^ * " < 1 » > < ^ ^ j ^ r~ZrV<r / ^ r < V ^ < - * 
^ Signature of S e l l e r ' I t * * ? * ^ ^ ^r^S*-**,?-
6 r£<j-
CHECK ONE / < / ^ /2sjzjrr*> S 
O Buyer accepts the counter offer , __»_*_-^-«r 
•LBuyer accepts with modifications on attached addendum A \ P ^ /) fj ^ '*%0' ^ *?y yg*/?ox vnrrrr.t ^a£&^: 
Signature of Buyer yy 
t^ff-ST 4*Pi>£^ 
Time (S-',}° (AM-PM) ^ n a t u r  t a / / /<?&£££
 2 ^ 
C O M M I S S I O N . The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to *r~*<-~r~j'7-2L. ^ ^ ^~<*~*+ ^T ^ ^ - ^ T / ^ 7~s*~t^i Brokerage) 
a commission of A< ytf s^ ^ 7 r ' 1* ^ * ^ * r~ / as consic -7- y^^u^ g y* c*S ">w 
$} *<JM~~ ^ -?W~ ^MlLl 
Signature of Selrer 1 Date Signa Date 
O O C U M E N T R E C E I F 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement t >t therefore 
be completed) 
A pj jacknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signan 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER 3\Gt 
Date 
/tc/w\. fl^ *fc^^-z*s*^~ ' 'MJ?u -?~?7 
Date 001-6- Date 
B ^ J personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be matted on | 1 l u ^ r ! . \ J 19 K / by 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the^fSeller D Buyer. Sent fr>y ^ S j . 1 , ^ ^ f A ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p f V ^ ^ ^ 
Page three of a four page form Seller's Initials ( Buyer's Initials (VJu^TJ ) Date fjA^ ^ ^ 
•K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreemot onjts 
behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
I COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and 
cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements which modify 
or affect this agreement This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this 
Aareement not expressly modified or excluded therein. 
i /N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated 
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of gleiajuJ^ Jky___SeHer. or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any 
express condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
shall be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney s fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest 
money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller 
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount 
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
0 ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any. shall abrogate this Agreement. 
P. RISK OF LOSS. A!i ris* o< loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property 
between the date hereof and the oate of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
replace damaged property prioi to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price 
and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, 
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing date shall 
be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. "Closing'' shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed 
and delivered by ail parties to the transaction. 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 17) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs 
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special 
warranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
said existing real estate contract therein. 
T AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selimg Erokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
V DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
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APPENDIX 2 
.NC1S H. SETTER 
?OY S. AXLANO 
[NT R. ARMSTRONG 
.WART M. H A N S O N , J R . 
U A M L. P R A T E R 
MO R. O L S E N 
JCE T. J O N E S 
»OLO G. O L O R O Y O 
H A R O J . L A W R E N C E 
».NCIS J . C A R N E Y 
- I I C H A E L H A N S E N 
* L F. H U E F N E R 
: H A E L W . H O M E R 
N W. ECAN 
ED R. SILVESTER 
ERIE P. SMANTEAU 
:HAEL L. ALLEN 
ARLES P. SAMPSON 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
A UTAH PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 
SEVENTH FLOOR 
CLARK LEAMJNG OFFICE CENTER 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH 8-4IOI-I-480 
TELEPHONE (SOl) 5 3 2 - 7 3 0 0 
CABLE A D O R E S S : SAXLAW 
TELEX: 4 5 3 1 5 7 
TELEC0P1ER:(80«) 5 3 2 - 7 3 5 5 
PARK CITY, UTAH 
(SOI) 6 4 9 - 4 0 0 0 
September 22, 1987 
HAND DELIVERED 
Craig L. Taylor, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
4 00 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: First Security Mortgage Company/William Kelley 
643 Snow Lane, Park City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Taylor: 
As we have discussed, this office represents William 
Kelley, Jr. By date of September 4, 1987, you sent Mr. Kelley a 
letter demanding that he must close on certain property located in 
Park City, Utah on or before September 15, 1987. In that letter, 
you advised Mr. Kelley that he should retain the services of an 
attorney. The letter was sent over the Labor Day weekend and Mr. 
Kelley was unable to contact our office until September 9, 1987. 
He traveled to Utah immediately to meet with us and was here the 
weekend following Labor Day. 
Despite the offer in your letter that First Security 
would cooperate in all ways with Mr. Kelley, that has not been 
the case. First, Mr. Kelley has requested a reasonable time within 
which to review the problem. First Security assumed the defense 
of the action and sought to clear title to the property and the 
water rights. On short notice and over a Labor Day weekend, First 
Security attempted to give Mr. Kelley five business days within 
which he must perform. Such was a totally unreasonable time based 
upon the fact that First Security had been involved with the problem 
for several months. Mr. Kelley could not travel to Utah and be 
advised of the situation in five days. You offered to make your 
files available, but this was not the case. Dan Egan went to your 
office pursuant to an appointment to review the files. Apparently 
because of a busy schedule, you were unable to meet with him. 
Subsequently, we received a copy of the Complaint and Answer only. 
We requested and were told we would be given copies of documents 
relating to water and water rights. This is critical, as the 
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Armstrongs have shut off the water which was in existence at the 
time my client signed the Earnest Money. Nevertheless, those docu-
ments have not been forthcoming. 
First Security Mortgage Company has totally frustrated 
my client's ability to perform. It has placed unreasonable demands 
on the time of performance and has deprived him of information 
necessary to evaluate the status of the property for which First 
Security undertook an action to clear title. The unreasonable 
demands of First Security have placed an extreme hardship on my 
client. The Earnest Money was signed on February 20, 1987. He 
has marketed properties and incurred losses resulting from First 
Security's delay in being able to close on the Agreement. These 
losses are not less than $4,000 per month. Nevertheless, despite 
these facts, First Security has acted in a most arbitrary and 
unreasonable manner in this action and has attempted to frustrate 
Mr. Kelley's performance under the contract. 
My client hereby tenders the down payment owed pursuant 
to the Earnest Money and Receipt to Purchase and all amendments 
thereto. My calculation is that the down payment is to be $130,000; 
$10,000 has earlier been placed in escrow which is to be a part of 
the down payment, requiring payment of $120,000. As we have seen 
no closing statements, notes, deeds or mortgages, we are uncertain 
as to the exact amount of cash necessary to close. Therefore, 
Mr. Kelley has wired $140,000 to Williamsburg Savings Bank to be 
held in an account and applied to closing. This tender is condi-
tioned only upon First Security honoring its obligations pursuant 
to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivering the property 
free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure. Mr. Kelley 
further requests that First Security resolve the issue regarding 
the water rights to the pond immediately in front of the home. 
As you are aware, this pond was full and was marketed as a part 
of the property. Through First Security's actions, the Armstrongs 
acted to cut off the water and deprive Mr. Kelley of the water 
rights. This problem needs to be resolved prior to closing so 
that Mr. Kelley actually receives that for which he contracted. 
The pond is essential to the aesthetics of the home and the prop-
erty. 
Although First Security has demanded a closing on Sep-
tember 22 and has refused to extend the closing for a reasonable 
period to allow Mr. Kelley to inspect that with which First Security 
has been involved for months, First Security still has not complied 
with the contract and provided copies of the mortgage and promissory 
notes which it seeks signed as a part of closing. It has not in 
any sense complied with its obligations pursuant to the Agreement. 
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As we earlier discussed, my client strongly desires to 
purchase the property and will not knuckle under to First Security's 
strong-arm tactics. We have filed this day an action seeking 
declaratory judgment and an interpretation of the contract. Mr. 
Kelley has asked the Court to interpret the propriety and fairness 
of the positions asserted by First Security. We will also ask 
the Court to determine if the strong-arm tactics of First Security 
are merely an effort to drive my client away from property which 
he has contracted to purchase, is capable of buying and wants as 
a residence for he and his family so that the property can be sold 
to others in a manner which will net a greater return to First 
Security. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
David R. Olsen 
db 
cc: Mr. William R. Kelley, Jr. 
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